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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
M & s CONSTRUCTION AND
ENGINEERING COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CLEARFIELD STATE BANK,
Defendant-Respondent,
VERN M. SMITH, et al.,
Additional Defendants-Appellants.
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I

Case No.
10708

Reply Brief of Appellants
STATEMENT OF FAOTS
Appellant respectfully takes exception to RespondPnt's Stah•rnent of Facts. That Statement does not
aecnrately reflect the record. The basis for this disagreement is that the Respondent has failed in its summary
to eonsider the fact that the disputed issues raised at
tlw trial were decided by the jury. The jury found that
an agreement between the parties was in existence, that
tlH' same was hreaehed, and as a direct result M & S
Construction Co. was damaged. Since all factual matters
1

are now resolved in favor of the Plaintiff, it is fundamental that the evidence be reviewed in this light. The
question before us now is not whether or not the jury
should have believed the Respondent's denials or
theories, hut rather whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. The Appellant
contends that the following facts amply show that there
was such evidence.
Respondent in its brief, as during the trial, spent
considerable time in attempting to show that the bid of
l\I & S Construction Co. on the Lost Greek Project was
from the onset unsound. Such reasoning was an attempt
to convince the jury that the troubles of M & S Construction Co. were due to the faulty business acumen of the
principals of M & S rather than the Bank's breach of
its agreement. It should be noted that Respondent submitted no direct testimony to corroborate this theory
in the form of cost analysis or other accounting data.
The Respondent's only evidence that the bid made
with Steenberg was inadequate was based on Exhibit N
entitled "Abstract of Bids." Respondent states in its
brief that the Abstract of Bids, though available to M
& S, was not reviewed by it prior to the time it entered
into the bid with Steenberg. For what importance may be
given to such assertion, a review of the record shows that
the Abstract was reviewed prior to the time that the bid
was made (T-147, 148, 150). It should be noted also
that the Bank had the same right to review the Abstract
before entering into the loan agreement with M & S,
as it was a matter of public record (T-161). Suffice to
2

say, the Bank, which entered into the loan agreement
based upon the strength o.f the M & S contract with Steenlwrg and the anticipated profits to be made from said
job, did not itself consider the Abstract of Bids of any
importance to the success of its agreement.
The contract between M & S and Steenberg was
not a bid comparable to those submitted by other
general contractors but, rather, was entered into on a
negotiated basis not only as to cost but also as to terms
of performance. For example, this agreement contained
provisions which prote0ted M & S from certain contingencies. (See sub-contract Def. Ex. 1.) They are:
(e) In the event it becomes necessary to drill

and blast in the access road the work shall
be performed at no cost to M & S Construction & Engineering Go. and shall be paid by
Steenberg Construction Co.

(f) In event grouting is needed in the diversion,
such grouting shall be paid by Steenberg
Construction Co.
(g) It is the intention of Steenberg Construction
Co. and M & S Construction & Engineering

Co. that the earth materials shall be moved
only one time. If it is necessary to move
the earth materials more than once, each
move of said material shall be extra work
and Steenberg Construction Co. will pay M
& S Construction & Engineering for the type
materials moved.

(h) On item #4, it is intended that this work be

done with scrapers. If however, shovel or
draglines are needed the extra expense is to
be paid by Steenberg Construction Co.

3

It appears, therefore, that the bid comparisons were
immaterial because the existing agreement was radically
different than the other bids on total excavation.
The Respondent raised the question of Exhibit N
upon cross-examination of Russell D. Stoker, a principal
of M: & S and the person primarily responsible as to
cost in negotiating the sub-contract with Steenberg. Mr.
Stoker testified ('I.1-111, 112) that he held a Civil Engill('('l' Degree and had twenty years of experience in the
engineering field. Included within this experience was
employment with the Bureau of Reclamation and work
as a private consultant.
l\fr. Stoker testified that comparison bids were not
the real criteria for entering into contracts of this nature. rrhe major consideration was, rather, the unit
"price for which we could move the dirt with the equipment we anticipated using to move the dirt with." (T196) He further testified that bid prices, particularly
as to overall costs, were not too helpful in submitting
and negotiating a bid with Steenberg (T-146). Mr.
Stoker testified (T-167, 168) that a detailed study was
made in regard to the anticipated costs of the Lost
Creek Project sub-contract. Initially, he computed the
time that it would take each piece of equipment to make
each separate trip to and from the areas concerned.
1'here was a further computation as to how much dirt
each unit of equipment could move on a daily basis.
Based upon the8e figurt>s, a decision was made as to
the cost of each move and as to each unit of work.
This procedure was the basis for arriving at the pro4

jt>ctecl costs prior to entering into the sub-contract. The
hasis of computation used by M & S in its bid, therefon\ was careful and prudent.
Certainly, it cannot be said that the jury acted
capriciously in rejecting Respondent's theory, and in
lwlit>ving Appellant's testimony as to the basis of anticipated profits. The negotiation and subsequent sub-contraet with Steenberg ·was approached in a businesslike
manner and there was no imminent danger of complete
financial annihilation.
Respondent in its brief correctly states that subsequent to August 22, 1963 the Bank loaned an additional
s11m in the amount of $25,000.00. The statement, however,
that M. & S was again having financial trouble is not
snpported by the record. However, one can assume that
if M & S requested a loan, there was a need for additional moneys. In answer to Respondent's brief, M & S
was not prior to October 23, 1963 having major trouble
with its sub-contract. On the contrary, on October 10,
196i1, the Bank received a letter from Steenberg, Plaintiff's Exhibit F, which stated that as of that date M & S
was performing satisfactorily and that Steenberg had
no knowledge of any default, claims or problems. Remittance was slow on the estimates, not due to the fault
of l\T & S but, rather, to the change in location of the
government fiscal agency. This fact obviously made the
Bank nervous because it had exceeded its loan limits,
hut it is certainly not a basis for stating that M & S
was in financial problems. Also, in the early part of
Ortoher (T-G6), Mr. Emil Walsh of Steenberg Construe5

tion Co. met with Mr. Barlow of the Bank and to.Id him
that the job '.Vas progressing satisfactorily and informed
him that he expected a profit of $70,000.00 plus the
acquisition of certain equipment ('T-66). Mr. Walsh
testified that at the beginning of a job of this kind, the
cost figure would be excessive. This explanation "seemed
to satisfy him as to the feasibility of the job.'' :Mr. Stoker
in his testimony explained in great detail the conversation he had with Mr. Barlow concerning the core trench
(T-116 to 123), which obviously raised the cost of the
job and, further, Mr. Stoker explained the delay in the
payment for this work. This evidence clearly explains
away the cost discrepancy raised by Respondent. The
Respondent's argument that the Bank ran into an unexpected situation which would justify the breach was
negated by the jury. The evidence shows that prior to
the breach, the job was progressing satisfactorily and
that the breach caused M & S to be defaulted on the job,
and thns to lose the fruits of its contract.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY FINDING UPON ANSWER TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT BY RESPONDENT TO FINANCE APPELLANT'S LOST CREEK SUBCONTRACT.

Respondent Bank contends that the oral testimony
admitted by tht> Court to assist the jury in finding that
there was sueh an agreement was admitted in violation
of the Parol J;~vidence Rule.

6

Respondent begins to build its argument on this
point from a definition of the Parol Evidence Rule found
in an article entitled "Parol Evidence - The Utah Version" by Professor Ronan E. Degnan found at 5 Utah
Law Review 158 ·where Professo,r Degnan says at Page
159:
"Parol ('vicknce is not admissible to vary, add to
or contradict the terms of a written instrument."
On that same page, Professor Degnan also said of
such definition:

"It has only brevity to commend it; a moment's

reflection tells every lawyer that it applies to
evic10nce of oral or written tran1sactions and that
as freqnently as not the evidence, written or oral,
is admissible. In short, it is a poor thing to call
a rule."

Of course, it was alleged by M & Sand found by the
jury that Respondent agreed to renew the short-term
notes from time to time, and Respondent cites 32A C.J.S.
'.25-1-, I~vidence, Sec. 895 in support of its proposition that
parol evidence cannot be introduced to show that there
was an agreement at the time of making of a note that it
would be renewed at maturity. Counsel did not, however,
refer to 32A C.J.S. 312, Evidence, Sec. 930, where, under
the topic heading "Limitations and Exceptions to Rule,"
it was stated:

"F:vidcnce Not Inconsistent with Writing.

In general, the Parol Evidence Rule does not
exclude evidence which does not tend to vary or
contradict the written instrument.
The Parol Evidence Rule does not preclude
the reception of parol evidence with reference

7

to a rnattPr evi<lPrn·ed by the 1niting where such
evidence relatt-s to a matter in pais or is of such
a charaetPr that it does not tend to varv or contra·
dict the written instrument.
'l'hus, parol evidence which does not vary
or ('ontradict the document under consideration
is admissible to establish thP connection of the
document with the case; to show matters as to
which tlw instrument is silent; to explain how an
agreern,mt is to be carried out; to shmv matters
rPquir0<l to be shown by the contract, or without
which it could not bP performed; to show the manner in which the contract was performed; whether
there was a breach of contract; and the effect
thereof; and to show a particular mode of payment or discharge agreed on by the parties.
Certainly the fact that a matter is evidenced
by a writing cannot preclude the admission of
parol evidencP of independent facts although they
relatP to the same transaction.
~Where a writing is executed in furtherance
of a parol contract, evidence of such parol contract does not offend against the rule forbidding
alteration, addition or variation of a written contract by parol." (Citing numerous cases including
Yardley v. Swapp, 12 Utah 2d 146, 364 P.2d 4;
for other Utah cases holding that parol evidence
may be introduced to explain the purpose of a
writing, see Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389,
360 P.2d 176, McCarren v. Merrill, 15 Utah 2d
179, 389 P.2d 732, Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, and
Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Bybee, 6
Utah 2d 98, 306 P .2d 773).

A n~view of tlwse pertinent authorities clearly shows
that the oral testimony admitted here was properly re-

8

ceivcd to explain the connection of the notes with the case
and to explain how the agreement was to be carried out,
and such testimony does not, in any way, clash with or
contradict the terms of the notes which were in fact
'
'
executed in furtherance of the parol agreement found
by the jury.
Of the three cases which Respondent cites to support
its position as set out in 32A C.J.S. 254, Evidence, Sec.
805, supra, two, of them (Lincoln National Life Is1trance
Com1w1111 v. Bastian, 31 F.2d 859, and Ford v. 8oitthern
:lfotor Com1n11~1, 203 Ala. 170, 93 So. 902) relate solely
and exclusively to written documents (a note and a life
insnnmce policy) which are not, in any way, involved as
a part of a more comprehensive oral agreement and,
hence, such cases, being so factually dissimilar, are not
pertinent or applicable to the case at bar. The third of
these cases, Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 P.2d 499,
involved a dispute between payees on a note, and the
portion of that opinion cited by Respondent merely states
that parol evidence could not be introduced to alter the
payor's obligation to such contending joint payees. The
opinion does, however, go on to recognize that:
"A rule has been established that an agreement by
parol which is collateral to the written contract
and on a distinct subject may be proved."
This position is also recognized in Higgins v. Belson,
ii(i Idaho 73G, 1G8 P.2d 813, where the Court stated:
"
that it has long been the rule that when
parties have not incorporated into an instrument
all of the terms of their contract, evidence is admissible to prove the existence of a separate oral
9

agreement as to any matter on which the document is silent and which is not inconsistent with
its terms. (Citing GarrPtt v. Ellison, supra)"
The American Law Institute, Restatement of the
Law of Contracts, Sec. 240, recognizes that oral agreements are often made contemporaneously and simultaneously with written agreements:
"Sec. 2-10. In What Cases Integration Does Not
Affect Prior or Contemporaneous Agreements.
( 1) An oral agreement is not superseded or
invalidated by a subsequent or contemporaneous
integration, nor a written agreement by a subsequent integration relating to the same subjectmatter, if the agreement is not inconsistent with
the integrated contract, and
(a) is made for separate consideration, or
(b) is such an agreement as might naturally
be made as a separate agreement by
parties situated as were the parties to
the written contract.
(2)

*'~**"

Comment d. on Subsection (lb) specifically recognizes that such oral agreements are very often made
contemporaneously with negotiable instruments:
''The justification of the Parol Evidence Rule
is that when parties incorporate an agreement in
a writing it is a reasonable assumption that everything included in the bargain is set down in the
writing. Though this assumption in most cases
conforms to the facts, and the certainty attained
by making the rule a general one affords grounds
for its existence, there are cases where it is so
natural to make a separate agreement, frequently
oral, in regard to the same subject-matter, that
10

the Parol Evidence Rule does not deny effect to
the collateral agreement. This situation is especially likely to arise when the writing is of a formal
character and does not so readily lend itself to
the inclusion of the whole agreem~nt as a writing
which is no.t limited by law or custom to a particular form. Thus, agreements collateral to a negotiable instrument if incorporated in it might destro>- its negotiability, and in any event would
deprive it of the simplicity of form characteristic
of negotiable paper. So in connection with leases
and other conveyances, collateral agreements relating- to the same subject-matter have been held
enforceable. These illustrations of what agreements "'might naturally be made'' without inclusion in an integrated contract are not exclusive.
It is not essential that a particular provision
would always or even usually be made in a separate collateral agreement. It is enough that
making such a provision in that way is not so
exceptional as to be odd or unnatural."

It is, therefore, the position of Appellant that the
terms of the notes were in no way altered, added to or
contradicted by the oral testimony which was, in fact,
received for the purpose of explaining the notes in
terms of a contemporaneous and more comprehensive
oral agreement to finance, as found by the jury.
Now turning our consideration from an analysis of
the legal authorities concerning parol evidence to an
analysis of the evidence as received by the Court during
the course of the trial, we note that Respondent has
urgPd that the evidence of the agreement was entirely
oral and not sufficient to support the jury's finding.
Respondent's assumption is completely unfounded and
lm\\·a rranted.
11

Significant and important written documents were
!'f'('PivPd into evid<>nee by the Court during the course
of tlw trial. One of tlwse was the document entitled
"Assignment of l\foneys Due and to Become Due Under
Contract'' (Exhibit B) which document was prepared
by R('SpondL'nt's legal counsel, dated August 20, 1963,
and coven,.d all estimates, funds, "moneys due or to become drn;" to 1\1 & S from Steenberg under the contract
dated.June 17, 196:3, and under the terms of which AssignmPnt l\f & S directed Steenberg to make all payments to
the bank and constituted the bank its true and la,.vful
agent to ask for, require and demand the moneys all
of which moneys,funds and estimates were~igned as
collateral security for loans made "and to be made" by
the RPsIJondent bank to Appellant as collateral security
for any and all liabilities "direct or indirect, absolute or
contingent, dm~ or to become due, now existing or hereafter raising of" Appellant to Respondent Bank.

It is significant to note that this assignment was not
executed as collateral for any specified loan but rather
was an assigrnrn•nt of "moneys due or to become due"
as "collateral st>eurity for loans made and to be made"
and as collatt>ral sf'curity for any and all liabilities "due
or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising."
Such languagP is entirPly consistent with and supports
tlw jury's finding that there was a revolving credit
arrangement as alleged by Appellant and that such shortterm notes were to be repayed out of moneys received
from estimates or by renewal of such notes, if necessary.

12

Another writing, in addition to the Assignment,
which supports the jury finding of the existence of an
agre<~ment for revolving credit is the bank's liability
ledger sheet (Ex. I~) which shows that such loans were,
in fart, on one or more occasions paid and renewed on
tlie same date or renewed the day following repayment.
Such procedure fit in with the "pattern" acknowledged
by the Respondc~nt's Executive Vice President, 1\1r. Barlow ( T-221, 222). Such procedure also fits the pattern of
a revolving credit concept as defined in U.S. v. Butter1rn rtl1-J11dson Corporation, 297 F. 971:

"'Tlw revolving fund is a brief expression of
recent coinage which usually refers to a renewable
credit over a definite period. In simple parlance,
it relates usually to a situation where a banker
or BH'Tchant extends credit for a certain amount
·which can be paid off from time to time and then
credit is again given not to exceed the same
amount."
Again, the existence of the agreement is confirmed
and supported by competent ·written evidence and there
is certainly nothing new or novel about the plan. Cases
an~ lPgion sustaining agreements for a line of credit to
he used as needed. The most recent Utah case on this
point is Commercial Security Bank v. Hodson, 15 U.2d
:388, 39;3 P.2d 482, in which this Court recognized the
<>xistence of this type of financial arrangement in the
business world. One of the cases cited by this Court in
the~ Commercial Security Bank case was Merchants Bank
of Canarla ?i. Sims, et al., 122 Wash. 206, 209 P. 1113,
which was decided in 1922, but even then the use of
"li11e of credit" agreements was recognized as an estab-

13

lished method of carrying on financing transactions
where the security is posted or the credit limit is established. This latter case is in point on several phases of
this appeal.
Respondent has also questioned the sufficiency of
the testimony which was received in addition to the
written documents referred to above. Such testimony did
not consist solely of the testimony of Mr. Stoker and
Mr. l\fendenhall as alleged by Respondent. There was
significant and important testimony received from other
witnesses which will be reviewed here; however, let us
first examine the testimony of Mr. Stoker and Mr.
:Mendenhall in its entirety as it relates to this question
rather than lifting isolated portions o.f such testimony
out of the transcript and giving it a tortured and strfilned
inte11Jretation out of context with the question now being
considered.
Mr. Stoker testified as follows concerning the discussion at a meeting between members of his company and
the Bank at which time the question of financing was the
topic of conversation (T.-J 13):
"And it was discuss(~d that the bank would finance U8 starting out with a $25,000.00 loan which
would be paid with draws from the job as time
progressed, and then as we needed financing
again, there would be another $25,000.00 advance
made or as the need arose."
Continuing this same ans·wer, Mr. Stoker said (T.114):

"And I discussed at that time with Mr. Barlow how I knmv or why I knew that we could
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successfully complete the job, why we could make
money on the job, approximately what we anticipated making, and why I felt we could make that;
but, of course, we would need financing as we
went along as any contractor needs. And particularly starting out a job in the early part, you
might say in the early half perhaps of any job
it takes rather extensive financing. And as you go
along and begin to recover some more of vour
money it would take less financing.
·
1f r. Olmstead: Now, if the Court please, I ob-

ject to the witness reminiscing on his experiences.
He was asked to conversations that were had.

A: That is exa:etly the conversations that was
had."
Respondent has referred to a portion of Mr. Stoker's
testimony (T.-115) in an effort to show ~hat Mr. Stoker
referred to an agreement to loan only $25,000.00; howevrr, \Ve must, of course construe this testimony within
the context of the entire transaction and not attempt
to attach a meaning· to such testimony which would be
alien to tlw context in which it was being related by the
witness. In addition, the bank's ledger sheet (Ex. E)
will show that at the time of the making of this second
loan there was still a prior loan of like amount outstanding which circumstances were in accord with the nature
of the agreement as alleged by M & S and as found by
the jury.
"v\Te had a great amount of money in other
words invested in this hole, this core trench, that
was not reflected in our draws. And it's the
rPason we had to have $50,000.00 that got up to
$60,000.00 loans from the bank who had agreed
to finance us through this job."
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Mr. Stoker later related a conversation between Mr.
Barlo\\- and himself (T.-129):
"A. Yr-rn and 1\fr. Barlow and mvself was
pn·srnt. We pointc>d out to 1\T r. Barlo\~- that we
had no source of funds other than the bank becansl' they had agret>d to finance us in this job.
~WP again discussed the reason we didn't have the
fuwls is buried in that core trench up there that's
sixt~--feet deep.
Mr. Stoker also related a conversation which took
place between himself and Mr. Harold Steed of the Bank
which, although somewhat informal in nature, clearly
shows what the understanding of this Bank official was
with respect to the agreement to finance (T.-124):
"A. 1\Ir. StPed said, 'Here we are, the bank
financ-ing this job, making it possible for you men
to rontinue to work on this job, and what do
we get but a measly 8 % interest on our money.'
He said, 'We ought to be entitled to a third of
tlH' iirofits or something on this, because it's us
financing you and keeping you going on this job
that's making this job possible'."
It is obvious then that 11r. Stoker's testimony was
not nearly so limited as Respondent would have this
Court believe, and when considered full~r is indeed compatible with the finding made by the jury with respect to
the agre<'HlE'nt to finance.

'rlw tPstimony of Mr. J arnes H. Mendenhall, when
viewed in its Pntirety, also supports the jury finding.
Mr. l\Iendm1hall said (T.-78, 79) with respect to a meeting with the Bank officials at which time the agreement
to financ-P was clisc-ussed:
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"A. Y{t>ll, we told him, we told him about the
project that we had, and ·we told him that we
,,-anted to see if we could get operating capital
to do this joh, and it was necessary to have this
rnom'y in order to do the job.
And we told him that we'd talked to, Commercial Security Bank in Ogden and they recommended that we go to the Ogden or Clearfield
State Bank first.
And so we took, took hours to go over this
and talk to him about it. So he said he would have
a nweting and let us know.
* * *"
(In response to questions concermng the later
meeting)
"Q. And who was there on behalf of the
bankJ
A. There was Mr. Thornock and Mr. Harold
Steed, Mr. vValter Steed and Mr. Barlow.
Q. Now, what was the conversation on that
occasion?
A. vVe all sat in Mr. Barlows office and we
discussed the possibilities of this project and of
them financing us. And they, they said they
would.''
::}'.!

'Vi th respect to a later meeting, Mr. Mendenhall had
this to say about the revolving credit agreement (T.-82):
"Q. Now, on this one we are talking about,
was anything else said?
A. This $25,000.00 had been increased to
$50,000.00.
Q. That was mentioned?
A. Yes.
Q. On the continuity basis~
A. Yes, sir."
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Mr. Ml:'ndenhall also stated with respect to a conversation with the Bank offirials (T-107):
"A. \V ell, they said that they had heard that
we took this job too cheap, and they'd heard this
through, from sources from their attorney; and
the only way that they were going to be able to
continue going with us is if we'd assign them the
monies from the job at Cedar City."
Respondent has attempted to make much of the fact
that the second $25,000.00 loan was actually made, which
is somewhat peculiar inasmuch as this is exactly what
was alleged by Appellant and found by the jury. There
is certainly nothing strange about the fact that the full
$50,000.00 ·was not loaned initially and that the second
$25,000.00 loan was withheld until such time as it was
determined that there was a need for it. This second
loan was made pursuant to the agreement and not as an
afterthought or in violation of such agreement as Respondent seems to be suggesting. In any event, the full
$50,000.00 loan was made as alleged by M & S in its
Complaint and the financing thereafter withdrawn completely and unexpectedly.
Respondent has failed to mention the important
testimony given by Mr. Emil Walsh, Vice President of
Steenberg Construction Company, the prime contractor,
and a man with over twenty years experience in the construction industry. With respect to the agreement to
finance, Mr. ·walsh stated (T.-58, 60, 61):

"Q. Now, during the course of your dealings
with these individuals vou mentioned in M & S,
did you l'Vt'r havP any ~ccasion to meet with any
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individuals connected with the Clearfield State
Bank?
A. Yes.

Q. Now, could you tell me about when was
the first occasion?
A. To the best of my memory, it would be
late in August or early in September.
Q.
A.

And where was the meeting held?
At the bank at Clearfield.

Q. And who would have been present to. the
best of your recollection~
A. Mr. Barlow was present and later called
in a \V alter Steed.
Q. Now, will you tell the jury what was
said and done at that meeting in regard to Lost
Creek1

* * * *

(Discussion between counsel and the Court)
A. Well, there was some small talk between
Mr. Barlow and Mr. Smith and myself introducing one another and talking about, oh, preliminary conversations to become acquainted. And
then got down to the reason for my being brought
over there was to discuss credit or loans for the
:M & S Construction Company. And the bank
·wanted to understand what the type work or the
procedure that they were going through.

"' * * *
(Discussion between counsel and the Court)
A. Mr. Barlow stated that some loans had
been already made to M & S and there was discussion about continuing loans, and we discussed
the project, the possible profits that were there,
the methods of payment of them, what I expected,
and what would be done, and Mr. Barlow stated
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that he was going to take care of his boys; that
hP had !mown Mr. Smith since he was a boy, he
had known J\fr. Stoker since he was a boy; he
did not knmv Mr. Mendenhall.
And it ·was a very nice meeting, and that
terminated it."
Even the reluctant testimony of Mr. Barlow, Vice
President of Clearfield Bank, on cross-examination lends
credence to the existence of such agreement as found
by the jury. When questioned concerning his deposition
of March 27, 1964, Mr. Barlow stated (T.-220, 221, 222):
''Q. All right. Was this question asked, and
tlw amnver that accompanies it, Mr. Barlow:
·~~ow certainly and you can answer that
"yes" or "no" - you certainly thought that they
were in a position to repay that?
'Answer: \,Ye thought it would be paid out
of this next draw.'
\Y as that question and answer asked you?
A. Referring to this first twenty-five thousand.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes. rrhat's the way we thought it would
he paid out.
(~.
Then this question was put to you, was
it not, Mr. Barlow:
'Question: And actually that was the program you had with them, wasn't it, that you
would advance on a short term basis this money
to nH'et payrolls and then would be covered by
thPir draw against the general contract 1
'Answer: That ·was the beginning with no
prornisP of ('Ontinuity after that. The first twentyfive thousand would be paid back the same way
with the next.'
A. The first 20

MR. OLl\ISTEAD: rrhe first~
A. First twenty-five thousand?
Q. (By Mr. Elton) Yes. "The first twentyfive thousand "-ould be paid back the same way
with the next."
And then this question was put to you, was
it not, :!\Ir. Barlow, under oath:
'That's right, but that was the pattern f
And you answered: 'Yes.' is that right~
A. Yes, that's what I -

Q. And the question was asked you: 'Of
the idea at the time~'
And your answer vvas: 'That's right.'
And that was under oath, in March of 1964,
was it not, l\f r. Barlow~
A. Yes. But I make it very plain that was
the beginning, with no promise.
Q. Never mind. I just asked you, sir, if
you gave that response to those questions, under
oath, on March 27th, 1964.
A. Yes. That was Q. Yes.
A. That was the beginning, yes."
There is one other thread which was woven into
the record upon which the finding of the agreement
was based and that is the testimony concerning the
function o.f Clair Nielsen who, although employed by
S\l & S as their au di tor, was virtually an employee of
the Bank for all practical purposes assigned to the task
of overseeing the financial matters of M & S and reporting to the Bank. It was his duty to release checks
and keep the bank fully advised as to the financial condition of 1\1 & S.
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In this res1)ect, Mr. ·walsh testified (T.-G2, 63):
"Mr. Barlow had asked Mr. Nielsen would he
go HI) and keep him advised regarding payments.
And Mr. Nielsen had stated that he certainly
would give Mr. Barlmv the truth and the information in every matter. 'rhe only ·way that anything could be avoided from his knowing would
be that if invoices or statements had been withheld. And Mr. Smith reassured Mr. Nielsen at
that time that he would withhold nothing from
him. And with that, why everybody seemed satisfied."
Mr. Mendenhall testified ( T .-105) :
"A. Was Mr. Barlow insisted that Mr. Nielsen sign the checks, payroll checks, and have a
record of, of ·what went on, and so forth."
Mr. Mendenhall, again (T-107):
"A. "'Well, we were to write these payroll
checks - and undPr Mr. Barlow's direction, he
told us to write these payroll checks, and wheneyer they come in to the Bank that he would take
care of them and Mr. Nielsen had to verify that
these, with Mr. Barlow, that these men were on
the pa~'roll, and so forth."
Mr. Stoker tPstifo•d (T.-128, 129):
"As it was, the draw didn't come in until the
24th or 25th. So there was one payroll in there
that the checks were issued to the employees under tlw instructions by Mr . .Jesse Barlow - we
knew we didn't have funds in there, we knew we
could not issue these checks, no one could issue
checks hut the arcountant, and it was under Mr.
Barlow's authority that these checks was issued
to rnePt our payroll when we knew we didn't have
funds."
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'The whol0 pattern then was that Clair Nielsen, nominally the accountant for M & S, was, in fact, more nearly
an employee of the Bank whose responsibility it was to
protect the Respondent Bank's financial interests, to
report to l\fr. Barlovv, and to issue payroll checks at
l\Ir. Barlow's direction.
The evidence both documentary and oral, when
viewed in its entirety, most certainly establishes the
existence of an agreement to finance as alleged by Appellant. The reflection of the transactions on the Bank's
ledger, the written assignment, the peculiar arrangement with Appellant's accountant, and the whole tenor
of the arrangement must be considered as highly unorthodox and unusual procedures if we are to accept
Respondent Bank's explanation of the circumstances surrounding these loans. Such facts are not, however, in
the least way unusual or unorthodox if we are to construe them as having arisen contemporaneously with and
in support of an agreement to finance as was found by
the jury.

POINT II
THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE JURY TO HAVE
BEEN MADE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Before proceeding to answer Respondent's Argurnt>nt, it will be helpful to set forth the exact agreement
which the jury found to exist between Appellant and
Respondent in its answer to special interrogatories
( R-87) :
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''Qnestion X o. l: Did the Defendant, on or
a liout A ngnst 23, 19G3, enter into an agreement
with the Plaintiff to lencl to Plaintiff as and when
requirod hy th<> Plaintiff for the purpose of providing finances to carry on its work under the
terms and provisions of the subcontract between
Plaintiff and Steenberg Construction Company
an amount not to excePd $50,000.00 by lending to
Plaintiff the s1m1 of $25,000.00 on August 23, 1963
to be due September 15, 1963 and to renew said
loan from time to time to the date of final payment by Steenberg Construction Company.
Ans'.ver: Yes."

It is noted that Respondent did not set forth the
special interrogatory in its brief and by paraphrasing
failed to include important language, particularly the
"as and when required" provision.
It should be pointed out at this time that there are
really two separate agreements involved here: one, the
agTeement to finance, which the jury found; and, two,
the subcontract between Appellant and Steenberg Construction Company.
Respondent has stated that ~Ir. Walsh testified that
the fastest the work on the subcontrad could have been
compleh•d was two years. (Brief of Respondent, Pg. 13)
In fact, Mr. ~Walsh said no such thing. What he did say
was that, "'I'he work could have been completed in two
eontraet st•asons" (T.-75) which is somewhat different
and does not negate the possibility of performance within
one year. At any rate, as will be shown, it is a question of whether or not the terms of the agreement itself
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lll'Pelnde performance within one year and the determination of such question must be made by lo·oking solely
to thr f<'rms of the agreement and not to extrinsic evidPnee. Appellant contends that if the terms of the ao-reel:l
rnrnt itself do not prohibit performance within one year
tliat performance is, therefore, possible within one year
and the agreement is not barred by the Statute not\\'i thstanding that the performance therof may, in fact,
tab' more than one year or that the parties intended it
to take more than one year. In opposition to this view,
H<·s11ondent extracts a phrase from 37 C.J.S. 558, Frauds,
Statute of, Sec. 50, but fails to reveal to this Court what
that encyclopedia says in the sentence following that
from ·which th0 phrase is extracted:
"\Yhere there is such po.ssibility of performance ·within a year, it does not matter that the
parties may have held the opinion that the work
under the contract might be extended beyond the
period of one year, or that the contract may have
given the parties more than one year to perform
their obligations or that, as a matter of fact, the
performance actually did extend over a greater
period than one year."
Respondent refers to the leading case of Warner v.
Te.rns & Pacific R. Co., infra, in asserting that the question of the length of time in which a contract may be
performed must be determined "according to the reasonalJlP interpretation of its terms." Again, Respondent has
~<·lPcted a phrase from a multi-page decision of an ap1wllatl' court; hmYevcr, Appellant does not quarrel with
thP elairn that such contract must be viewed "according
to the reasonable interpretation of its terms." Respond25

ent has made a mistake, however. The words "fair and
rea~:;onahle'' refer not to a determination of probability
of actual performance within one year, but rather to the
terms of the contract itself and whether or not a "fair
and reasonable" interpretation would admit the possibility of performance within one year. In other words,
"fair and reasonable" refers to the terms of the agreement itself and not to the facts surrounding the circumstances of performance as alleged by Respondent. This
was the view taken in Hellings v. Wright, 29 Cal. App.
649, 156 P. 365, which was cited by Respondent. As further indication that this case actually supports Appellant's view and not Respondent's view, the following
language from Page 368 of the Pacific Reporter is noted:
"The statute does not declare void a contract
which may not be performed ·within a year or
which is no.t likely to be performed within that
period. It includes only agreements which fairly
and reasonably interpreted do not admit of a
valid execution within the year." (Emphasis
added.)
In Kressly v. District Bond Company, 138 Cal. App.
565, 32 P.2d 1112, the ·Court stated at page 1114 of the
Pacific Reporter:
"Whether the agreement is invalid under the
Statute of Frauds as urged by Appellant may be
determined by the test laid down in M cK eany v.
Black, 117 0~1. 587, 4-9 P. 710, as follows:
'If the contract, by its terms, is not to be
performed within a year, it is void; b?-t _if it
may "by its terms" be performed withm a
year, it is not even though it may not bt>
}wrfo.rnwd or is not likely to be performed
within that time.'
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"The statute does not declare void a contract
which may not be performed within a vear or
which is not likely to be performed within that
period. It includes only agreements which fairly
and reasonably interpreted do not admit of a
valid execution within a year." (All emphasis
added.)
Respondent has also relied upon Sec. 500 of Williston on Contracts. It is noted that this section is entitled
"Contracts "N" ot Intended to be Performed ·within a
Y(•ar." A distinction is made in this section between
contracts which can be performed within a year and
eontracts which cannot be performed within a year. Such
as can be performed within a year are referred to as
follows:
"l. A contract which can be performed as
the parties intend that it shall be performed within a year though they fully expect that performance will take a longer period and" (proceeding
on to the second class).
This class of contracts describes that into which the
agreement to finance falls, and any performance thereof
would have been just as the parties had intended; namely,
(1) the subcontract would have been completed even
though the parties fully expected it to take longer than
one year, or (2) M & S would have required no financing
bPyond the one-year period. (More ·will be said later of
this second point.) Therefore, the distinction which this
section makes is not applicable to the case at bar. It
should be pointed out, however, that this same section
µ;oes on to say:
''On the other hand, if the contemplated mode
of performance might possibly be carried out in
1

27

less t lian one yPar, the con tr ad would not he
witl1in tlw statute .... " (Citing Bickel v. Wessin.rrer, 58 Or. 98, 113 P.:-l+, holding an oral agr<'<_'rnent
tliat a mortgagor might rPdeem at any time within
thrP<' y1·ars not to lw ~within the statutti.)
Respondent has abo reliPd upon Stanley v. Levy
and .J. Zentner Comvany, lG Nev. -1-32, 112 P.2d 10-17,
which quotes from Fourth Edition of Browne on Statute
of Frauds (the Fifth Edition was published in 1895);
howevt>r, in tliat ease the testimony showed and the Court
found that then• ~was no contract, and even if there were,
hoth irnrties testified that their intended agreement, by
its terms, would last for more than two years. Inasmuch as tht>r<-' \Vas no contract found, this case is factually dissimilar to the case at bar and is not properly
cited hy Respondent in support of its position.
RcspondPnt has also relied upon Markowitz Brothers, Inc. v. Jolin A. Volpe Construction Company, 209
l~.Supp. 339 (1962). This case was decided upon Florida
law wltieh, in the opinion of the District Judge writing
tlw decision admittedly represents a mino.rity view. Befor<> going· on to decide the specific question before that
court, the ovinion makes r<>ference to the majority view
(which Appellant urges in this appeal) and the numerous
authorities in support thereof as follows:
"It is amiarent from a consideration of the
texts and L'.Ommentators (-1-9 Am. Jnr. Statute of
Frauds, See. 23-:37; Brmvne on Statute of Frauds,
0th FM., SPc. 271, et seq.; 3 \:Villiston on Contracts,
i3rcl 11Jd., SPr. 500 Pt sPq.; 25 R.C.L. Sec. 452 et
seq.; U9 ALR G:3+, Anno.; Statute of Frauds
against oral contrads not to bl' performed within
a ~.:ear), as \\'Pll as thP lt>ading cases (e.g. ~Walker
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v ..Johnson, 9G U.S. -12-1, 2-! L.Ed 83-1; \Varner v.
Texas and Pacific Railway Company, 164 U.S.
-t18, ~7 S.Ct. 147, -11 L.Ed. 495, which exhaustively
considers the cases, both English and American)
that the general rule, both in this country and in
I~nglish jurisprudence before the time of the Declaration of Independence, was to the effect that,
unless the trrms of the contract specifically, or
at least by necessary implication, negatived the
right to perform within a year, the statute did
not avply if under any possible circumstances
performance was possible within that time; this
was without regard to the intent of the parties,
even though they obviously intended and expected
performance to last beyond a year, unless such
time of performance was a term, expressed or
implied of the contract."
The Court tlwn 1vent on to acknowledge the existence
of the minority rule under Florida law and decided the
case on the basis of this minority rule relying chiefly
on Smnmcrnll v. Thoms, 3 Fla. 298 (1850). Appellant
nrges this Court to reject the minority rule. To do otherwi HP would result in the perpetuation of considerable unct>rtainty in matters of this type where it was necessary
to go beyond the te1ms of the agreement and make an
Pxtensive and often confusing and frequently unrewarding excursion into collateral and speculative circumstances. It should be the aim of the law to promote and
(•stablish certainty and stability, in contractual relationships, be they written or oral, and this laudable objective is served much better by adoption of the majority
rnl<~ requiring interpretation of the teims of the agreement only, rather than the minority rule which requires
tlrn eXPreise of greater subjectivity and, therefore, in-
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creases the danger of uncertainty and instability through
such needlessly complex legal machinations. 'rhe minority rule does not possess any salutory qualities which
commend it over and above the majority rule; it is simply a more complex and uncertain route to basic, but
always elusive, judicial perfection and should be rejected
as an inferior legal tool.
Appellant's Brief cited Granvold v. Whaley, ::\9
\Yash. 2d 710, 237 P.2d 1026, wherein it was held that performanre of a certain agreement was not possible until
a certain dam "'as completed and the fact that the dam
could have been completed within one year but was not
expected to be and was not, in fact, completed for three
years, did not place the agreement within the purview
of the Statute (Citing 2 Corbin on Contracts 541, Sec.
4-1-5, quoted on Page 12 of Appellant's Brief). Respondent alleges that this case is factually dissimilar from
the case now before the Court stating that "Independent
evidence shmved the enterprise probably would no.t be
succPssful until a certain dam was completed and also
affirmatively showed that the dam could be completed
in less than one year." This assertion does not contradict Respondent's position but, rather, supports it. There
is nothing in the agreement to finance or in the subcontract ·which, within the terms thereof, prohibits performance within one year, and, therefore, the Statute is
not applicable. The vVashington Court stated at Pg.
1031 of the Pacific Reporter:
"For example, the Army engineers in charge
of the construction of the locks might have decided for aught that appears in the record to ex30

pedite the completion of the lodrn so as to be
usable within one year. For the doing of a thing
to be impossible, it must be physically or legally
ineapable of being done."
There is nothing in the record which indicates that
perfor:mance of the subcontract and, hence, of the agreemPnt to finance, was physically or legally incapable of
being done within one year, although it was expected
that the subcontract work would take more than one
Far which would not, incidentally, necessarily mean that
tlw agreement to finance would take more than one year
as will be pointed out later.
Appellant has also relied upon the recent case of
Commrrcial Security Bank v. Hodson, 15 Utah 2d 388,
:-rn3 P.2cl 482, wherein the Court stated:
"'J'he exact length of time that this loan
should last is not specified, but there is nothing
in the evidence which indicates that the loan
should not terminate in less than a year."
Respondent alleges that this case is not pertinent
hecause the length of time that the loan should last is
set at more than one year, to-wit, date of ''final payment" on the subcontract. This is not so. There was no
date established to which the agreement to finance had
to continue. The agreement to finance could have been
fulfilled and completed in two ways, namely, (1) At the
date of "final payment" on the subcontract and even
though there was an upper limit set in the subcontract as
to how long the work could take, there was no limitation
as to how quickly it would or could be performed and,
PVPn though it may have taken more than one year,
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then• was nothing in either the terms of tlw suhconhad
or in the tt>rms of the agn~elll<='nt to finance which prohihited iwrfonnance \\-ithin one ypar; and (:2) Upon Appellant construction company finding ·within one year
that it no longer needPd financing to continue the projcd
and inasmuch as such loans were to bP made onl>- "a~
and when rPquired" by Appellant, such contingPncy could
very easily have occurred within one year.
As a matter of fact, the tPstimony takPn during th!·
course of the trial indicates at several points that joh~
similar to that which Appellant had undertaken freqnent1>- require financing only dnring the early or initial
stages of the project and that such subcontractors thereafter become able to function ·without financing during
the later and final stages of construction when the heavy
and ex1wnsive work has been com1Jleted and this point
was fully explained to Respondent Bank.

·wal sh

testified (T .-66) as follows:
"A. Mr. Barlow asked how ·would the joh
prnct>ed. And I told him that normally these johs
start out that a pPrson has to involve certain
sums of monev into tlwrn before tlw monev starts
to come hack· and that the first part of 'the job
was more expensive to perform than the latter
part; that the>T would probably have to go and
invest mon('Ys before the monev would corn<' hark.
And I said tlwv would have mo.re money at a latPI"
date than at ~nv other time. And that from the
hPst figures that I could make out there would be
a $70,000.00 cash profit plus the acquisition of
the machinen- that .l\f & S was going to acquirr
to fill out th~ir fleet of equipment.
And that sePrned to satisf>' him as to the f<>asihilit>T of the job."

I\I r.
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Mr ..Mendenhall testified (T.-81, 82) as follows:
"A. It - Mr. Walsh done most of the talking. He introduced himself and told about his organization and how it operated and how they
disbnrs0d the money and so forth. And he told
l\fr. Barlow that it cost a lot of money to start
a job out and that the money would come later;
and that we would need this, this revolving credit
to see us through on this job."
He said even as big as his company was that
they had to go borrow operating capital. He says
it was no sin to have to go borrow to operate,
C'apital to start out a job.
So, Mr. Barlow seemed to acknowledge this,
or accept this."
Mr. Stoker testified (T.-114) as follows:
"And I discussed at that time with Mr. Barlow how I knew or why I knew that we could
successfully complete the job, why we could make
mont>y on the job, approximately ·what we anticipated making, and why I felt we could make that;
hnt, of course, we would need financing as we went
along, as any contractor needs. And particularly
starting out a job in the early part, you might
say in the early half perhaps of any job it takes
rather Pxtensive financing. And as you go along
and begin to recover some more of your money,
it would take less financing."
Although it is correct to look only to the terms of
the agreement itself, which terms reveal that M & S was
to make loans only "as and when required'' and that
such language could clearly result in a performance in
lt>ss than one yt>ar, it is helpful to look to this testimony
whiC'h indicates a strong possibility and even a probability that, in fact, M & S was likely to have required
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financing only during tlw early months of the projt•<·t
and not beyond one year. If :M & S had decided that it
no longer required financing at any time prior to thP
expiration of one year, the contract would have been
fully performed and completed.
The agreement to finance then falls exactly within
the rule set forth in Commercial Security Bank v. Hodson, supra, as one in which the exact length of time of
a loan is not specified and one in which there is nothing
to indicate that the loan should not terminate in les'
than a year. Therefore, based upon that recent case,
the Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the agreement
to finance.
Appellant referred to Zions Service Corporation v.
Danielson, 12 Ptah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982, at Pg. 14 of its
original brief, and quoted from Column 1 of Pg. 985
of the Pacific Reporter, which is again set forth here for
convenience:
"Y\7here the agreement can he performed
\Yithin one year, though this be done by election
of one of the parties to terminate. there can be
no doubt but that the Statute of Frauds is not
applic(llJle. '\Ve agree with the following statement from the Restatement of Contracts and believe it determinative of this question:
"The words "cannot be fully performed"
must be taken literally. The fact that performance within a year is entirely improbable or not expected by the parties, does not
bring the contract \\-ithin this Statute.' (Sec.
198, Comment b.)
"In Johnson vs. Johnson, 31 Utah 408, 88 P.
230, we ruled that a contract by a purchaser of
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land to pay the seller 'for life, one-half of the
crop:'< produced on the lands' was not within the
above provision since death might occur within
one year. The right to terminate a contract at
any time is likewise such an event a.s may occur
within a year and hence the statute does not apply.' (All emphasis added.)
Respondent attacks this important case as not being
applicable without really saying why and refers to Williston on Contracts, Sec. 498, an analysis of which revt·als that it makes a distinction between "an excuse for
not performing" and "completion of performance.'' In
fact, the section is entitled "Promises Subject to an Express Def easance or Providing for Alternative Perform:meP." In the same paragraph which Respondent has
referred to, it is stated at Page 591, Williston on Contracts, Sec. 498:
". . . The Courts recognize a distinct differenee between a contingency which fulfills the
tPrms of the contract and a defeasance which prevents fulfillment."
"vVhere the promise is in the alternative the
contract is not within the statute if either alternative can be performed within a year from the date
when the contract is made, even though the other
cannot be so performed."
Appdlant contends that the work under the subeontract could have been completed ·within one year, but
assuming argnen<lo that it could not be so performed it
is ohserved that we have another contingency which
would result in the complete fulfillment and performance
of the terms of the agreement to finance and not a
ddeasance which would prevent fulfillment, and that
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otlwr contingency would be a determination by M & f.;
at any fonp within one year that it no longer needed
financing \Vhereupon the agreement wonld have be('n
fulfilled pursuant to the "as and when'' clause of tlw
agreern<:>nt. As noted abov<:> in -Williston, S<:>c. 498, such
conting<:>ncy doPs not place the agreement within thl'
Statute of Frauds. (Citing Warner v. Te.ras a11d Pacific
R. Company, supra.)
It it-; ohvions that Respond<:>nt has failed to mah
the distinction between an excuse for not performing and
complPtion of performance. To support this erroneou~
vie\\·, Respondent has cited Coan v. Orsinger (spelled
Prosinger in Respondent's Brief) CCA, D.C. 1959, 265
F.:2d 5G5, in which case the Appellant was to receive
$75.00 per wePk and free rent in return for his managing
some apartments until such time as he finished his
studies o.f law at Georgetown University or until obliged
to leave school for poor scholarship or some similar reason. The Court incorrectly held that such agreement wa~
baned hy the 8tatute of Frauds. Williston is very critical of this case, and cites it as an illustration of tlw
misapplication of the Statute of Frauds saying at Sec.
498B, Pg. 603:
"Another instructive case on tlH' misapplication of the rnle and the 00casional failure or inahilitv of tlw courts to distinguish hehveen fulfilrne~t and annulment involved an oral agrPement
for employment providing for alternative performance. In this case, the defendant employer
agreed to engaged the services of a first-year
student at the Georgetown Pniversity Law Center, for a stipulated consideration as. resid~nt
manager, 'until the plaintiff cornpk•ted hlS studies
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as a student duly matriculated in Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., or was
obliged to discontinue these studies.'
Misconceiving the nature of the promise, as
did the decision in the Sickles case (Packet Co. v.
8icl'"lcs, 72 US (5 Wall) 580, 18 L.ed. 550) the
court held that the clause 'if appellant (law student) were obliged to discontinue his law studies'
- a contingency which could occur within a year
- cont<•mplated an annulment of the contract
which would operate as a defeasance and that the
8tatute of Frauds barred recovery. In so holding,
the majority, of course, failed to distinguish between a discharge from liability because of a refusal to perform the first clause, and the possibly
complete and timely perfonnance o.f the second
provision. Actually, the promise made by the defrndant employer was to employ plaintiff as
resident manager during a period of time which
would not exreed the time it might take to complPte the curriculum at the Law Center, or a much
shorter one, if, for one reason or another, plaintiff
'\\'as obligPd to discontinue' his studies. 'rhus, if
tlw contemplated contingency occurred within the
~'Par, it would result in the completion of plaintiff's duties as resident manager ·within the year,
and the requirements of the Statute would be
satisfied."
[fospondent relies upon Stahlman v. National Lead
Co1111H111y, 318 F.2d 388 (19G3); however, a reading of
!hat ('ase shows that Plaintiff who was seeking to establish the oral contract testified that such alleged oral contraet "was to be a permanent type of arrangement" and
that it "would be a continuing proeess down through the
.\'Pan;." Obviously
. then ' the tem1s of the contract which
he was attempting to establish could not by the terms
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thereof have heen performed within one year and, inasmuch as this case is to.tally dissimilar on the facts,
it has no application to the case at bar nor does Firr:rnan 's Fund Inc. Co. v. Williams, 170 1\Iiss. 199, 15-1- So.
545, in which case the Court said that the "termination"
contemplated in the case was such as would constitute
not a performance of the contract but a mere frustration
thereof.
Respondent further cites 37 C..J.S. 557, Frauds.
Statute of, Sec. 48, which is a correct statement of th~
law if applied to the proper factual situation; however,
Respondent again fails to make the distinction between
a termination which constitutes "full and complete performance" and a termination which constitutes a "rescission or cancellation" of the agreement and not a performance o.f it. Additional language contained in that
section may be helpful to the Court, however.

"Section -1-8. Possibility of Termination. By '
Actual Perforrnance Under Permissive Provision.
''Although by the terms of an oral agreement,
a period in excess of a year may be ailmved for
its perfonnance, yet, if on the happening of a
certain stipulated event which may happen within
a year, it can be completely performed consistentlv with the rights and understanding of the
parties thereto, it will not be regarded as within
the statute.'' (Citing Blue Valley Creamery ·1·.
Consolidated Products, 81 F.2d 182, Respondent
again failing to note the difference between a cancellation of the agreement and a full and completf'
performance such as we have in the case at bar.)"
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f,'astrrn Statrs Refrigerating Company v. Teasdale,

(Missouri), 211 S.W. 693, involved a factual situation
,,·]iprein Defendant was obligated to store apples for a
period of fifteen months but withdrew them from storage
\rithin less than a year and claimed that this termination took the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.
Thl' distinction was again made between a termination
of that class which may be performed within a year
<·onsistentl~· with the terms of the agreement and not
in violation thereof and a termination which constitutes
a eanedlation or def easance of the contract.
Respondent cites 37 C.J.S. 555, Frauds, Statute of,
Ree. ·Hi, to refute Appellant's contention that the statute
\ms not applicable because Appellant may have required
financing for a period of time shorter than one year.
RPspondent has failed to note that this section is entit!Pd "Agreements Definitely Fixing Time of Performance 1\lore Than One Year" and has a subheading which
~tatrs "A contract to do a particular act during, at or
aft<_.r a definite period of time which is more than a year
afkr the making of the contract is within the statute."
Ohviously, this section has no applicability to the case
at bar inasmuch as the "as and when required" provi'iion of the agreement to finance does not definitely fix
the time of performance at more than a year and is not
"a definite period of time which is more than a year
after the making of the contract."
I\·rhaps the leading case on the Statute of Frauds
Warner i·. Texas and Pacific R. Company, 164 U.S.
+H-:, -!1 L.Ed. 495, 175 S.Ct. 147, which has been referred
1~
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to abovP. ThP facts of that case an' as follows: Plaintiff brought an action against the railroad upon a eontract by which it was agreed between the parties that if
the Plaintiff \rnuld grade the ground for a switch and
put on the ties at a certain point on the Defendant's
railroad, the Defendant would rmt down the rails and ,
maintain the S\vitch fo1· the Plaintiff's benefit for shipping purposes as long as he needed it. The Defendant
railroad pleaded that the contract \\'as oral and withi11
the Statute of Frauds because it was "not to be iwrformed within one year from the making thereof." Tlw
United States Supreme Court held that under such fact:;
the Statute of Frauds did not bar the contract.

The Court makes an extensive and exhaustive review
of this portion o.f the Statute from its enactment in
England in 1G77 to the time of the decision. Based upon
the decisions reviewed in the exhaustive opinion, thP
Court made the following pronouncements with respect ,
to that particular case whieh, it is noted, had a factual
situation virtually identieal with that now before this
Court. The following is quoted from that opinion at
Pg. 50+ of L.Ed. and Pgs . .J-3-± and -±35 of the U. S.
Reports:
"'rh<> parties may well have expected that tlw
eontract would continue in force for mon' than
one vPar; it may have been ve1T improbable that
it w~uld not do so; and it did, in fact, eontinm·
in force for a much longer time. But they mad<'
no stipulation which in terms or by reasonable
infe1·encf~ required that result. The question 1~
not what the probable or expected or adual P('J'
fonnanct~ of the contract was hut wlwtlwr tlH'
conh'act, according to the reasonabk~ interprc40

tation of its terms, required that it should not
lw performed within a year. No definite term
of time for the performance of the contract ap~
]Wars to have been mentioned or contemplated by
the parties nor was there any agreernent as to
tlw amount of lumber to be sawed or shipped by
the Plaintiff or as to the time dnring which he
should keep up his mill. The contract of the railrnad company was with and for the benefit o.f the
Plaintiff personally. The Plaintiff's own testimony shows (although that is not essential) that
lw understood that the performance of the contract \rnuld end with his mvn life. The obligation
of the railroad company to maintain the switch
was in terms limited and restricted by the qualification 'for the Praintiff's benf'fit for shipping
purposes as long as he needed it;' and no contingency which should put an end to the performancf' of the contract other than his not needing
tlw switch for the purpose of his business appears
to have been in the mouth or in the mind of either
part~'· If. within a year after the making of the
contract, the Plaintiff had died or had abandoned
his old business at this place, or for any other
reason had ceasf'd to need the switch for the shipping of lumber, the railroad company would have
lwen no longer under any obligation to maintain
a switch and the contract would have been brought
to an Pnd by having been fully perfonned.
The complete performance of the contract
depending upon a contingency which might happen within the year, the contract is not within
the Statute of Frauds as an 'agreement which is
not to he performed within the space of one year
from the making thereof'."
Ba::;l'd npon a review of the authorities, it has been
c:hown that the agreement to finance was not within the
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Statute of Frauds for one or both of the following twr
n~asons; namely, (1) there was nothing which showed
that the terms of the agreement itself required that thl·
loans should continu<-' for more than one year; and/m
(2) that pursuant to the terms of the agreement to finance Appellant was to secure loans only "as and when
required'' by Appellant and that the terms of such
agreement to finance could have been fully perforrned
and satisfied at any time within one year upon Appellant's detennination that it no longer required further
financing and making no loans \\'ith Respondent therPafter all within one year.

1

POINT III
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE $38,852.54 CHECK WAS NOT HELD BY THE BANK IN TRUST
AS A SPECIAL DEPOSIT OR AS A DEPOSIT FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE.

None of the cases cited by Respondent on this point
involves a factual situation wherein there was a special
endorsement on a check or where a bank received funds
with knowledge of a special purpose, as in the case at
bar.
Contrary to Respondent's contention, some of the
September items w<>re, in fact, paid by the check deposited and assuming arguendo that they \VPre not, Mr.
Barlow, the Bank's executive vice-president, had full
knowledge that his hanl\: was holding several thousand
dollars worth of payroll checks which M & S expected
to be paid by the deposit of this check (T.-128, 129), but,
notwithstanding such knowledge, these checks were dis42

honored and the funds applied to notes being held by the
Bank, one of which had not yet become due and another
of which had been purchased by Bank officials in their
personal capacity ( T-45-57).
'!'he authorities cited under Point II of brief of Appellants adequately support the contention that the Court
rnlPd incorrectly with respect to Appellant's Second
Cause of Action.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES.

Tlw onl:v theory of damages presented to the jury
was on the basis of loss of anti~ipated profits on the
Lost Cr0ek Dam Project (R-88) encompassed in the
Court's instruction on damages. (Instruction 18) The
jnry was instructed that before an award could be made,
tht')' 11111st determine with reasonable certainty that the
Plaintiff would have realized profit from the performaneP of the sub-contract (Instruction No. 18) (R-88).
Further, in Instruction No. 20 (R-99), the 'Court stated
that the misfortunes and damages suffered by Plaintiff
had to be directly caused by Defendant's actions and
fnrther explained that if financial loss would have
oeemTed regardless of the breach, no damage could be
assessed. Thus, the Trial Court properly instructed on
the questions of certainty, causation and proper items
to be considered in arriving at a verdict (Instruction
i\'o. 22) (R-99). One cannot argue, therefore, that the
jury was misled as to the proper legal criteria. We
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submit that there was sufficiency of evidence to suppo 11
the jury's verdict.
(a) Causation, or fact of damage.
Fnder snb-st'ction (a) o.f RespondPnt's brief, it wa_,
contended that :JI & S was in such dire finaneial condition
that its failure was imminent. It \\'as stated: "The collapse of l\I & S was assur('d at the time it signed the sub
contract of .June 17, 1963 for no amount of financing
would save a losing job of this size." The Appellant contends that said stat('nwnt is without foundation. As 'rill
lw s1weifieally shown, under sub-section (b) it ·was clear
that both the principals of l\I & S and the principals at
Clearfield State Ba11k looked to the contract in question
as lwing the basis for the rt>payment of the loans based
upon the anticipated profits. After all available evidencr
was pn,sentPd to the Bank, it decided to effectuate tlw
loans in c1110stion, and it is indeed ironic that now it
contends that from th(' onset it was a losing job.
As has heen pointed out, on the trial of this matter.
Clearfield State Bank did not attempt to corroborat1
this theory by any direct evidence. All accounting factual
information was available to Respondent (T-62, 63, 105,
107, 128, 129). Notwithstanding the fact that no evidence
of this nature was adduced to sustain the theory of imminent financial disaster, the Respondent on pages 28
and 29 of its brief contends that it was a mathematical
impossibility for M & S to have finished the job success·
fully.
RPspondent's attack is two-pronged:
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1. 1t C'laims that the job was not progressing satisfadorily; and,
That there were inadequate funds to continue the
joh.
In the Statement of Facts, testimony is cited which
rwg-atc's the theory that the job was not "going well."
(WP rrf er again to the general contractor's letter of
Odober 10, 1963 sent to the Bank.) Their theory ignores
the fact that :!\fr. Stoker explained in great detail that
a proper claim was being processed for the additional
\rnrk that was done on the project. It is clear that prior
to tlw hreach, particularly in light of Mr. Pritchett's
tP~tiiuony, the failure to honor the checks would necessitate M & S's default on the job and the Bank was so
\Yarned ( T-87). The real reason for the breach of the
(·ont ract \\·as not the progression of the job but, rather,
a" ~Ir. Pritchett testified, that the Bank officers were
justifiably concerned about the Bank exceeding its legal
loan limits.

The Respondent's computation fails to take into
aecount additional moneys that were due M & S. For
rxample, it was testified by Mr. Vern Smith that the
.1obs at Dugway and Cedar City were in the final stages
of completion and they expected to receive $35,000.00
(T-183). l\Ir. Vern Smith's testimony also clearly shows
that the cause of the catastrophe was the breach of the
agreeUH'nt wherein he testified that once the Bank dishonorPd its agreement, M & S was, pursuant to the sub"011tract, defaulted on the job and, as a direct re::mlt,
lost $100,000.00 equity in equipment (T-183). The
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acCJuisition of this equi11ment vms considered in the di,
cussion with the Bank as part of the anticipated profit
of the job. There is, therefore, ample evidence that thf'
Appellant was progressing with the job and the reason
for the dire results that occurred was the violation of
the agreement to continue the financing, which negated
all possibilities for any profits on the job.
(h) Amount of damages.
Respondent in its brief undf~r sub-paragraph b a].
leges initially that the jury's finding of damages and
the Conrt's denial of a motion for a new trial based
upon the damages awarded should be reversed for thP
reason that th<.> Appellant failed to prove damages with
reasonable certainty. In discussing the question of a
jury verdict based upon anticipated profits, one must
look at the facts of each particular case in determining
whether or not the verdict should stand. The courts have
made nnmerous distinctions based upon the type of business involved, the nature of the testimony, the availability of another remedy, and other varying fact situations. rro cite general principles is, we feel, of little
help.
The Respondent cites 15 Am. Jur. Damages Section
150. Appellant feels constrained to set forth the sentence following the one quoted:
"But it must be borne in mind that since
profits are prospectivl? they must, to some extent,
be uncertain and problematical, and so, on that
arcount or on account of the difficulties in the
way of proof, a person complaining of breach of
contract cannot be deprived of all remedy, and
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uncertainty merely as to the amount of profits
that would have been made does not prevent a
recovery.''
An<l, again, in the second paragraph cited by the Respondent we believe the complete sentence should be set
out:
''; but if, ex·cept for the wrongful act, there
must have been profits, notwithstanding any other
circumstances in existence at the time of the
1wrpetration of the wrong, the question of respectiveness and contingency is actually negatived."
W <' do not disagree with the Utah cases c~ted by
H.••spondent but feel that they are not in point and are
not helpful to the factual situation at hand. For example,
the factual situation in VanZyverden vs. Farrar, 15 U.2d
367, 39:3 P.2d 468, involved a situation whereby the evidPnce temfored was a mere opinion that the owner felt
if he would have received $3,000.00, this money would
haVf~ allowed him to make a profit on the ranch.
ln Jenkins vs. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532, the
case did not involve a loss of anticipated profits factual
situation.
As has been pointed out, the question of damages in
this ease was not based upon the loss of profits of M & S
eorporation, its goodwill or net worth but, rather, was
submitted solely on the question of lo•ss of profits that
j[ & S suffered on the Lost Creek Dam Project. The
Bank examined and reviewed carefully the sub-contract
between the Appellant and Steenberg. There is no question that it based its loan upon the assignment of this
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contract. 'I'his fact is what distinguishes the factna
situation here from the cases cited by Respondent. Jr
other words, the parties looked to the profits as a con
sideration of the agreement. Mr. Barlow, an offiCl'i
of the bank, testified ( T-21) that the assignment rn
the proceeds of the job was all the collateral that i1
needed. Mr. Emil vValsh, an officer of Steenber~
testified that he explained the potential profit to Clear
field State Bank (T-57) and, further, that he revieweu
with the Bank the anticipated profits (T-G4). This testi
mony of looking toward the anticipated profits was cor
roborated by l\Ir. Mendenhall (T-83). Russell D. Stoker'~
testimony is also clear that the question of anticipated
profits was the basis of the loan agreement ('l'-114). Thl'
Respondent cannot deny this fact for, in fact, its own
officers complained that its financing was allowing them
(Respondent) to go on the job and they should receiw
one-third of the profits instead of a measly 8% (T-12.tl.
Here we have a situation ·where the Bank is now urging
upon this Court that the anticipated profits were too
speculative. However, they originally only looked to
these profits and judged them, as bankers, sufficient to
extend credit.
In examining the issue of whether or not the dam
ages ·were proven w-ith sufficient certainty, ·we feel it is
noteworthy to examine Section 331 of the Restatement
of Contracts as to the degree of certainty required in
these cases :
"a. Th<:> reqnire~nent of reasonable certainty
does not mean that the plaintiff can recover notl.1ing unless he establishes the total amount of Ins
harm; nor does it mean that he cannot get dan148

ages unless he proves the exact amount of his
harm. The requirement merely excludes those
elements of harm that cannot be evaluated with
a reasonable degree of certainty. There is usually
little <lifficulty in proving the amount of actual
expenditures, even though it may be impossible to
prove the amount of expected profits (see sec.
~)33). Furthermore. there are cases in which the
exrwrience of mankind is convincing that a substantial pecuniary loss has occurred, while at the
same time it is of such a character that the amount
in money is incapable of proof. In these cases
the defendant usually has reason to foresee this
difficulty of proof and should not be allowed to
profit by it. In such cases, it is reasonable to reqni re a lesser degree of certainty as to the amount
of loss, leaving a gteater degree of discretion to
the jur~·, subject to the usual supervisory power
of the court."
ThP Respondent has cited U. S. v. Griffith, 210 Fed.
~d l l, which involves a different situation than here, in
that the only evidence tendered was the President o.f the
corporation's statement that he believed the corporation
would have earned approximately $5,000.00 a year. Of
rourse, this evidence was not allowed to sustain the
verdict. However, as to the necessity in regard to certainty of damages, the ·Court did state as follows:
"Prospective profits are necessarily somewhat uncertain and problematical but in cases
where damages are definitely attributable to the
wrong of the defendant and are only uncertain
as to amount, they will not be denied even though
they are difficult of ascertainment."
f.lee also Br01c11 vs. Alkire, 295 Fed. 2nd 411. Therefore,
RespondPnt's position that the jury verdict should be
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set aside because of uncertainty is fallacious becau~r
there was, as has been discussed, definite damages attributable to the breach.
The issues basically presented in this case have been
discussed and decided in Cornmercial Security Bnnk n.
Hodson, 15 U.2d 388; 393 P.2d 482. The similarity in tlw
fact situation is remarkable. This case involved an agrePment of continuing financing and of damages based upon
prospective profits. The majority of the Court in that
case found that the evidence was sufficient to suvport
actual, and not merely speculative, damages. Because of
the similarity factually and legally of this case, we feel
it is not redundant to examine the Court's statements
closely. The precise defenses raised here were raised by
the Bank. The Court held, however, that one cannot
claim that anticipated profits are too speculative when
competent business people look to the same as security
for their loans and stated:
"In a business venture of this kind there is
hound to be some uncertainty. But with a project
-which seems certain to succeed by competent businessmen, the evidence cannot he considered to be
merely speculative. The evidence shows that
when the vice-president learned the details of thr
project Jw said he did not see hovY they could lose.
Also the bank president seemed confident of the
success of this venture, and the loan committee
showed the same reaction by approving the loan.
Also the appellants, who are e)\._rperienced in th~s
kind of business, were certain of their success if
the dressed beef turnover loan were approved.
So we find nothing that is merely speculative in
this project. For it seems to have been recognized
1
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by both bankers and the appellants as being a
fairly certain business project."

lt is Appellant's position that factually it is in
a :-:trong-er and more persuasive position than the parties
in the Commercial Security Bank case and meet the objrcti ons of the finding of actual damages voiced in the
dissenting opinion. In that case, the parties planned to
gd into the business of a custom-kill arrangement in the
prnces:.;ing of beef. The evidence tendered as to costs
was that the parties anticipated an average profit per
a11imal of a certain dollar sum. However, it was necessary that a sufficient number of animals be processed
in order to effectuate a desired net amount. To operate
this new venture, Appellants requested the Bank to. finance them on a turnover revolving loan plan. Subsequent thereto, the parties were contacted by the Bank
off ic0r wherein he stated that something had gone wrong
and that a bank customer had threatened to withdraw
unless they breached their contract. Upon its breach, the
Appdlants were unable to continue and brought an action
for prospective damages. The evidence of profit in the
Commercial Security case was the cost item of processing
one item and the projected profit based upon the unknown quantity of the market. Justice Crockett in his
dissent disagreed with the majority on the basis of the
uncertainty of availability of livestock, the extent of the
SPasonal weather, the scarcity or the abundance of feed,
and the instability of prices, both of feed and animals.

In the present case, the figures presented to the parties
and 11nderstood by them were firm. Each item of excavation was charted out, based upon gross estimates and
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costs. The cost figure was calculated mathematically and
based upon the experience of a qualified engineer and thr"
same, therefore, is sufficient to support actual damage~.
The contingencie.s objected to in the dissenting opinion
were not present here. Appellant contends, thereforP,
that the holding in the Commercial Securit,y Bank case,
which was the pattern of the trial in this matter, be
sustained. Also see Merchant Bank of Canada vs. Sims,
122 vVash. 106; 209 P. 113, cited by the majority opinion
m this case.
In Sposaro vs. Matt Malspino & Co., 63 vYash. 2<l
679; 38.S P.2d 970, the same issues are discussed. In
that case, a sub-contractor had bid on a particular joh
for the defendant-contractor, and based upon this bid
and anticipated gains from the contract, the general contractor loaned the sub-contracto.r sums of money over a
period of time to meet payrolls. On the last check the
contractor "stopped payment" on the grounds that thP
jobs were not proceeding as he had anticipated. During
this period, the sub-contractor ran into unexpected problems in the construction of the sewer. On conflicting
evidence, the jury decided that the general contractor
had wrongfully terrnjnated his agreement. The issue
presented was whether or not there was an error in submitting the case to the jury on the issue of anticipated
profits. The Court in detail on page 97 4 of the Pacifa
Reporter ontlined the proof offered by the sub-contractor. They sho·wed that this was the largest contract undertaken by them. They showed that they studied tht
bids and inspected the areas of construction and studied
the plans and specifications. Based upon this study, they
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hrokP the contract down by listing all the materials to
he nsPd, the price based upon quotation from suppliers,
the equipmc>nt the crew thought necessary to operate the
joh. Their estimates and computations were based in part
npon their general experience in the business and the
handling of the same type of equipment and crews in
tlw past. Testimony was tendered on the computation
of how much per foot it would cost to do the sewerage.
A!Ro, costs "·ere tendered as to the estimated cost o.f
excavation. Based upon this, the parties testified as to
their total loss of profits.
The issue presented, therefore, was whether or not
tlw damages under this form of proof were illusory,
uncertain and speculative. Appellant insisted that the
sanw was true beeause the sub-contractor actually lost
money on that part of the contract partially performed
Jirior to his breach. Respondents argued that they had
;;;hown a pr<>cise and detailed manner in preparing their
hid. The Court held:
" ( G) But we also aeknow ledge and give equal
status to the correlative rule that, where an ente:rprise or undertaking in which profits were contemplated is thwarted by tortious misconduct or
hv reason of a breach of contract, the loss of
a~ticipated profits, if proved with reasonable
certainty, may be an item of damages occasioned
hv the tortious misconduct or breach of contract.
Difficulty in ascertaining the damages, or uncertainty as to the amount, provides no basis in logic
for denial in toto. If the evidence affords a reasonable hasis for establishing the loss, an issue
arises to be resolved by the trier of the facts.
Wcn.zler & Ward Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Sel53

Zen, 53 Wash.2d 96, 330 P.2d 1068; Gaasland Co.
·v. Hyak Lbr. & llf ill1Dork, 42 Wash.2d 705, 25i
P.2d 784; Dunseath V. Hallauer, .n vVash.2d 895
253 P.2d 408."
'

Prior in this brief we have set forth in detail thP
type of proof that was submitted in this rase as a ha8i~
for anticipatt>d profits. It is clear from the evidencP
that this c:ase is different than many other cases involv.
ing anticipated profits in that !Clearfield State Bank
cannot complain of being assessed on this basis for thP
reason that the same was within the contemplation
of the parties at the time the~' entered the agreement.
The job had just shortly begun prior to the breach and
the cost figures relied upon by Respondent were immaterial because of the unexpected core trenching problem (T-118 to 123). The Bank was on notice of the core
trenching problem (T-123) and agreed to continue to
finance. The fact of damage is based upon Stoker's
testimony that the gross revenue expected was $754,000.00 and the cost of the job would approximate $525,000.00. The effect of the breach is clear and Mr. Vern
Smith testified that as a result of the breach l\f & S
lost $100,000.00 equity in equipment. (Said equipment
was included within the anticipated profit estimate.)
Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence on
anticipated profits was based on the best evidence available, that is, the actual computation agreed to by thP
parties plus the expert opinion of l\fr. Stoker based upon
his computations. Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vo,lume 5, Section 1346, Page 3872, states that evi·
dence of experts is admissible to sustain an action for
damages based upon pro'Spective profits. Also see
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U11l'rini Stone Co. vs. P. J. Carling Constrnction Co.,

1-tO {T.S. 20-±; 36 S.Ct. 300; 60 Law Ed. 636, which holds
that:
"The profits which a subcontrn0tor probably
would have gained if the contract had been proceeded with in the ordinary manner should not
have been excluded from the jury as contingent
and speculative in an action by him against the
general contractors for the latter's breach of the
contract, where there was testimony from an experienced witness as to the probable cost to the
subcontractor o.f furnishing the materials and
doing the work called for by the subcontract."
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

1t is the Appellant's position that the matters raised
by Respondent in this point have been substantially coverd in this brief and extensive comment would be repetitious.
A::; to the admission of Mr. Stoker's testimony, howPVPl', it is clear that such testimony was proper.
Under the circumstances of this case, the contract
on the Lost Creek Darn had just commenced prior to the
hrl-'aeh of the contract. Mr. Stoker testified with suffieiPnt certaintv to the value of the anticipated profits
and how the same was determined. It must be rememhrn,d that there is a clear distinction between the mea~nre of proof necessary to establish the fact that the
l'laintiff ::;nstained some damages and a measure of proof
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necessary to enable the jury to fix an amount. 8tor1v
ParchamPnt Paper Co. vs. Patterson Parchment Pupn
Co., 282 F.S. 555, 51 S.Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 54.J., Willi~ton
on Contracts, Sec. 1346 at page 3779, drmvs the follo\\•inn
analogy:
~

"'In an English case the plaintiff hy contract
was entitled to lwcome one of fifty participants
in a bPauty contest, twelve of whom wen-' to lw
selected b>· judge>s for the bestowal of prizes. ThP
plaintiff was not notified of the time when the
decision and award was to be madt> and, therefon·.
failed to ]irt>sent hersdf, and twelve other p1Tsons wt>re awarued the prizes. A recovery of suhstantial damages ,\·as upheld. It was recognized
that tlw plaintiff would have had, if the dPfrndant
had not committed a breach, about one chancP in
four of securing a pri,,;e. The court declined to
take a distinction hetween a chance and a probability so far as the rig·ht to recovery was concerned. As was said in a Minnesota decision: 'lt
is no exoneration to defendant that his rniscondlrnt, -which has made inquiry as to the quanhu11
of harm necessary, renders that inquiry difficult.
rl'he best the law can do is to award approximate
compensation. Its failure to. do even and exact
justice in such cases is not more conspicuous than
in many others. No other remedy is available.
To allo~v onl~v for loss of time and ~xpenses would
put a pn~mium upon breaking contracts and den)
substantial justice.' "

It is submitted that when a breach ocC'urs prior to tlw
time an experience of cost items cannot intelligently be
arrived at, the> proof of anticipated profits is sufficit>nl
to sustain a verdict. 1\Ir. Stoker's testimony, however.
was not as flimsy as that suggested by the Respondent
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for, in fact, he testifid with great particularity as to the
cost faetor in regard to the core trench investment.

R.v asserting that the Statute of Frauds question
should have been submitted to the jury Respondent
is again urging this Court to adopt the minority position as sPt forth in J1arkowitz Bros., Inc. v. The John A.
rolpc Ounstructi.on Co., supra, referred to under Po.int
lI ahovl'. Although the determination of such problems
is <'1iSPntially a question of law, the minority rule would
requi 1·p juries not only to make findings of fact but also
lo \\Testle with the complex and subtle provisions of
tht> Statute of Frauds before reaching a decision. It is
snhmitfrd that Respondent's position is erroneous for the
following reasons:
1. 'I'here was no factual issue to be determined by

the jury in regard to the Statute of Frauds unless the
Court is prPpared to accept the minority rule hereto.fore
disem;s<·d.
2. That the Statute of Frauds question presented
in this caHe is a legal one, not a factual one.
As to the argument that the damages in this case
ill'<' <'Xcessive, we believe that it should be pointed out
that thP procedure used in Davis County was to submit
th,, que:-;tion of liability in the form of two special interrogatories. After each of these interrogatories was answered in the affirmative, the jury was instructed
As to damages and allowed to deliberate on the same.
~Peondly, the same motion was ar~ed to the Trial Judge
and ht> rP jected this theory o.f excessive damages due
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to prejudice. Again, the Respondent relies upon th~
Abstract of Bids, which certainly do€sn 't rise to th 1,
level claimed for it. The Respondent ignores or continue,
to ignore the fact that the cost was high because
o.f additional work done and not because the job was
progressing poorly and that Appellant was protcctrrl
'under the subcontract with Steenberg and entitled to receive payment for sitch .additional work pursuant to the
express terms of such sitbcontra.ct. (T-103, 104)
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE BANK ON ITS COUNTERCLAIMS AND
CROSS COMPLAINT WHEN THE EVIDENCE SHOWED
THAT THE NOTES WERE SECURED AND THE BANK HAD
DESTROYED ITS SECURITY IN AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS
OF THE AMOUNT OF THE NOTES.

Respondent's Point VI discusses those matters which
were raised in Point III of Brief of Appellants and
requires no reply except to point out that if, as Respondent claims, the Bank had the right to receive the
Steenberg check, even so, it was bound to receive and
apply such check pursuant to and in accordance with
the terms of the assignment and the terms of the written
endorsement set forth on the ha.ck of such check.

CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in granting an order for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of
an alleged Statute of Frauds violation and, further, erred
in refusing to grant judgment for Appellant on its second
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causP of action. Such order should be vacated and judguwnt entered in favor of Appellant in accordance with

the wrdict for damages found by the jury at the trial.

Respectfully submitted,

KING & KING

202-203 Smith Building
Clearfield, Utah
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Salt Lake City, Utah
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Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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